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(Not) Speaking for Animals and the Environment:  
Zoopoetics and Ecopoetics in Yoko Tawada’s  
Memoirs of a Polar Bear
The thoughts of animals were written clearly on their faces 
as if spelled out with an alphabet. I found it difficult to un-
derstand that this language was illegible to other people. 
(Tawada, Memoirs 102)
Giving Face
In animal autobiographies, which I have conceptualized as “literary auto-
zoographies” elsewhere (Middelhoff 2-3), animals are represented as narra-
tors of their lives. Rhetorically, giving animals human voices is known as 
prosopopeia, i.e., the bestowing of “a face, the mask (prosopon-poiein) through 
which the dead, the absent, and collectives are supposed to have spoken”1 
(Menke 7; cf. also de Man 926-30). Surely, the extent to which human 
and nonhuman voices, discourses, and concerns in these texts coalesce and 
compete with each other depends on the form as well as the generic and 
historical contexts of a text performing “acts of speaking-for that cross the 
species boundary” (Herman 6). Literary autozoographies may import moral 
messages and satirize social phenomena; they may challenge a reader’s per-
spective, produce sympathy for nonhuman beings, or argue on behalf of 
those considered “dumb” or “speechless.” 
Similarly, in the history of environmentalism, “hypostasized Nature (with 
a capital n)” (Morton 162) or “the” environment (Moore) has been spoken 
for by various parties, individuals, and, of course, the authors of texts. Na-
ture writing and ecopoetry have their non-literary counterparts in ecological 
agendas of politicians and banners of environmental activists. If humans 
are turned into proxies for oceans or “the” climate, prosopopoeia moves to 
the public platforms of political representation. Yet the question remains: 
1 Prosopopeia gives “Toten, Abwesenden, Kollektiva, in der Fiktion ihrer Rede ein Gesicht, die 
Maske (prosopon-poiein), durch die sie gesprochen haben sollen” (Menke 7). All translations 
from the German are my own.
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“If nature cannot speak (at least not in public forums), who has the right 
to speak on nature’s behalf?” (Cox 4). And: “If the dangers of speaking for 
others result from the possibility of misrepresentation” (Alcoff 23), how can 
we not misrepresent when speaking for “nature” and nonhuman animals?
It is hardly surprising that people find themselves obliged to speak for 
“the” environment in a time emotionally and conceptually charged with 
such powerful narratives as—to name just the most prominent—the Anthro-
pocene (Zalasiewicz, Crutzen, and Steffen), the Capitalocene (Moore), or the 
Chthulucene (Haraway); narratives which are simultaneously challenged or 
even rejected by climate-skeptics. Speaking for or on behalf of nonhuman 
others, however, is a venture onto thin ice. Andrew McMurry, for example, 
cautions against “constru[ing] nature as voiceless and in need of speaking 
subject status” (55). Doing so not only privileges speech as the sole means 
of political representation but also, McMurry argues, “puts the onus of audi-
tory responsibility directly on those special categories of ‘listeners’ such as 
natives, ‘country people,’ women, children—who have long been constructed 
as somehow more receptive to the voice of nature than the rest of humanity” 
(55). One might wonder then whether there can actually be a poetics which 
speaks for but does not undermine the existence of expressive nonhuman 
voices and faces.
Thin ice, language, and acts of speaking-for stand at the heart of Yoko 
Tawada’s latest novel Memoirs of a Polar Bear2 in which the lives, experiences, 
and narrative voices of three polar bears unfold, guiding readers from the 
Soviet Union to the GDR and post-reunification Germany. This chapter 
first outlines two systematic and interpretive approaches to, and the implica-
tions of fiction speaking for animals. It then focuses on the critical potential 
of Tawada’s novel by investigating how the text challenges representations 
of animal experiences by acts of (not) speaking-for, i.e., by engaging in 
animal acts of speaking-for while simultaneously exhibiting the inability 
and inadequacy of speaking for other species and “the” environment. On 
the one hand, my reading focuses on the way the text foregrounds the 
epistemological and linguistic limits of speaking for nonhuman lives. Yet it 
is not only the very staging and visualization of the impossibility of high-
2 The book was published in German in 2014, entitled Etüden im Schnee (“Etudes in the 
Snow”). The title of the English translation is not only at odds with the fact that it is not 
one, but three polar bears becoming (auto)biographical subjects. It also fails to acknowl-
edge the playful and experimental character of the acts of cross-species speaking-for already 
indicated in Tawada’s German title.
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fidelity nonhuman self-representation that this multi-perspective narrative is 
concerned with, but also the pervasiveness as well as the use and abuse of 
polar bears by means of language, symbolism, and anthropocentrism. On 
the other hand, then, this reading tries to challenge the notion that Memoirs 
can be labeled as either animal advocacy or environmental advocacy writing 
(Raglon and Scholtmeijer 122, 131). Tawada’s animal life-writing straddles 
these categories by reflecting on, and experimenting with, different modes 
of speaking for polar bears and simultaneously exposes the implications of 
our cultural, and at times unimaginative, engagement with this species.3 In 
that respect, Tawada’s (auto)zoopoetics is imbued by ecopoetical concerns.4 
Speaking for Animals
Recent scholarship has probed what it means to read animal autobiography 
without letting the autobiographical animal vanish behind the screen of an-
thropocentric allegorical readings (cf., for instance, Keenleyside; DeMello; 
Middelhoff). David Herman has introduced a useful distinction between 
two different “acts of speaking-for that cross species lines” (7). Drawing on 
politeness theory and interactional sociolinguistics, Herman distinguishes 
between acts of speaking-for which “butt in” and those which “chip in”: 
“When butting in,” Herman writes, “a speaker voices an utterance of which 
he or she is not only author but also the principal, whereas when chipping 
in a speaker voices an utterance in which the spoken-for party or parties 
function as co-principal(s)” (2). A principal is constituted by the inferences 
and the discourse of a speaker or an author (4). 
While chipping in “signals that one shares so much with another dis-
course participant that one can take up his or her position in talk, building 
solidarity,” a speaker or author butting in displays his or her “more or less 
human-centric interests” (7) and disregards solidarity. When animals are 
turned into narrators or speaking characters, these acts of speaking-for can 
oscillate between the poles of butting in and chipping in “depending on the 
scope and quality of the humanimal co-authorship in a given segment of 
the narrative” (10). Furthermore, Herman regards irony and self-reflexivity 
in “cross-species speaking-for” (9) as acts which “not only reflect but also 
3 Ursula Heise, however, reminds us that the image of the polar bear is subject to divergent 
cultural meanings in the face of climate change (241-44).
4 Cf. the introduction of this volume for the concepts of zoopoetics (Moe) and ecopoetics 
(Rigby). 
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help shape cultural ontologies marked by relatively prolific allocations of 
possibilities for selfhood among animal agents” (13).
Marco Caracciolo has discussed the functions and outcomes of speaking 
for animals in slightly different terms. Focusing on representations of ani-
mal consciousness, Caracciolo argues that autozoographical texts like Italo 
Svevo’s Argo and His Master (1927), “may sensitize readers to the puzzles of 
consciousness (both human and animal)” (488): 
[J]ust as Svevo’s dog fails to understand what goes on in the human world of his 
master, humans should face their inability to grasp—to fully grasp, at least—non-
human consciousness and its many instantiations across the animal world. This 
realization paves the way for … a more intimate sharing: we can relate to animals 
not because their experiences are transparent to us but because our recognition 
of animal consciousness is complicated by a mutually partial and imperfect com-
prehension. (500-01) 
Attributing mind, subjectivity and agency to literary animals, while at the 
same time acknowledging the limits set to linguistic representation and mind-
reading alike, literary texts call attention to the limits of language as well as 
to the epistemological anthropocentrism mirrored in our conceptions and 
representations of animal phenomenology. 
(Auto)Zoopoetics of Negativity
Tawada’s novel has been hailed by reviewers and critics as a fantastic, reckless 
leap into human-animal history (Matsunaga) and a “zooanthroposynthesic 
quasi-memoir” (Smith). The novel offers various readings—also depending 
on which of the three polar bear narratives one is focusing on—ranging from 
persiflage on commercial literary industry and migrant literature, to artist 
novel, and, of course—in a nod to Kafka—to “animal parable” (Saalfeld in 
Tawada, Interview).5 Yet, so far, Tawada’s experimental approach to animal 
(auto)biography and the link between animal life writing and environmental 
5 In fact, Kafka and his pseudo-autodiegetic animal narrators play a vital role in the novel 
(cf., e.g., 49-53)—as does E. T. A. Hoffmann’s autobiographical Tomcat Murr, and Heinrich 
Heine’s Atta Troll. Due to the confines of this article, I cannot elaborate on the intertextual 
acts of cross-species speaking-for. Suffice it to say that references to other literary text oc-
cupied with the question of how (not) to access and represent the experiences of animals, 
are at the core of the first part of the novel which is particularly concerned with the ques-
tion of how to write an animal autobiography.
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 issues in the novel has drawn little scholarly attention,6 which is what I will 
be focusing on in the following discussion.
Memoirs retrospectively narrates the course of the lives of three polar 
bear generations—grandmother, daughter, and grandson, starting with the 
unnamed grandmother in Moscow before the end of the Cold War, moving 
to her daughter Tosca in the GDR state circus, before coming to a close with 
Tosca’s son Knut living in the Berlin Zoo at the beginning of the twenty-first 
century. Although each of the three narratives integrates multiple references 
to the lives and relations of the two other bears respectively, the three nar-
ratives are distinct from each other, separated not only by the division into 
three chapters, but, first and foremost, by the different narrative approaches. 
The text presents the reader with three modes of “acts of cross-species 
speaking-for” (Herman 10) in the course of its three-partite structure. The 
first chapter has the grandmother polar bear writing (experiencer) and relating 
(narrator) her autobiography; in the second chapter, the text follows Barbara, 
the circus trainer of polar bear Tosca, trying to compose the bear’s biography 
in the first person. Yet from the very beginning Barbara is more concerned 
with the narration of her own biographical experiences than her role as bear 
ghostwriter. It is only at the end of the chapter that Tosca literally takes over 
(Tawada, Memoirs 158-65): A printed bear paw marks the break between 
Barbara’s narrative voice, i.e., Tosca’s biography, and the autozoographical 
narration of Tosca. The last chapter introduces Knut, the polar bear baby 
turned world famous in 2006/2007, narrated by a seemingly heterodiegetic 
narrator. The reader only learns that it is actually the bear himself narrating 
his life from a third-person perspective when Knut, during a conversation 
with a sun bear, finds out that individuals refer to themselves in the first 
person (208). 
The novel thus starts as an animal autobiography (chapter 1) and then 
turns into what might be called a “humanimal (auto)biography” (chapter 
2) insofar as both animal and human (auto)biographers materialize as “hy-
bridized, ‘humanimal’ authors and principles” (Herman 10), blurring “the 
boundaries between auto- and heterobiography” (H. Schwalm). It closes with 
an animal’s “autobiography in the third person” (Lejeune), which turns into 
a first-person autographical account in the course of the narrative (chapter 3). 
All three of these acts of cross-species speaking-for involve shifts from 
butting in to chippin in, indicative of the oscillating movements between the 
construction and deconstruction of a “realistic” representation of animal 
6 Notable exceptions are Hoffmann as well as O’Key.
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minds and (self-)perceptions. Marco Caracciolo has pointed out that three 
elements are needed for a representation of animal experiences to be con-
sidered believably “realistic”: 
[F]irst, the representation of nonhuman consciousness must resonate with read-
ers’ expectations and beliefs; second, it must be sufficiently rich and detailed to 
offer a holistic account of animal consciousness;… third, it must draw on read-
ers’ familiarity with everyday situations and events in a way that is sufficiently 
defamiliarizing to account for the assumed cognitive characteristics or abilities of 
nonhuman animals. (487-88) 
If these criteria are met sufficiently, Caracciolo argues, readers can be drawn 
into a “cognitive illusion” (488): They believe to be presented with a plau-
sible, phenomenologically sound representation of nonhuman cognition. 
Memoirs engages with the readers’ common knowledge and imaginative 
projections of polar bears in order to first cater to the idea of “becoming 
polar bear,” and then upset this idea. Two examples from the first chapter 
might suffice to illustrate this point. The first chapter, the grandmother’s 
story, starts as follows: 
Someone tickled me behind my ears, under my arms. I curled up, becoming a 
full moon, and rolled on the floor. I may also have emitted a few hoarse shrieks. 
Then I lifted my rump to the sky and slid my head below my belly. Now I was a 
sickle moon, still too young to imagine any danger. Innocent, I opened my anus 
to the cosmos and felt it in my bowels…. Without my fluffy pelt, I’d been scarcely 
more than an embryo. (3)
Anticipating a polar bear life narrative, not least due to the title of the book, 
the opening scene affirms and attends to readers’ notion of a zoomorphic 
infantile character with a furry body whose shape and color resemble the 
moon. Furthermore, the representation of the bear’s mind appears “nuanced 
and fine-grained” (Caracciolo 490) with the perspective of the child-bear 
noticeably defamiliarized, i.e., “animal-like.”7 As a consequence, readers are 
drawn into the illusion of observing a polar bear mind which is re-enacting 
childhood memories. Yet the process of aesthetic immersion may start to 
become more difficult in the next sentence: “I couldn’t walk very well yet, 
7 Knut’s (first-/third-person) self-account is rendered in a similar way. The young bear’s 
naïve, limited understanding of his surroundings and the human practices observed cor-
responds with the way readers might conceive of the experiences of a young, comical 
polar bear in general, of Knut’s representation as “Cute Knut” in the media in particular 
(Tollmann 251).
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though my paw-hands had already developed the strength to grasp and hold” 
(Tawada, Memoirs 3). The neologism “paw-hands” is at odds with Western 
culture and vocabulary. Only humans have hands, as Heidegger notoriously 
claimed, bears are supposed to have paws (Derrida). Juxtaposing words 
commonly used to describe animals in opposition to humans with terms 
usually reserved for humankind, the text highlights the linguistic arbitrari-
ness and cultural contingency of the distinction between “paw” and “hand” 
reminiscent of what seems to be humankind’s desperate need to maintain 
its position as the sole user of language (and tools in hands). Furthermore, 
this juxtaposition also reminds readers that it is indeed hands writing lives 
and autobiographies, certainly not paws: This polar bear’s mind and her 
life are text, not “the real thing.”
The irritation is appeased shortly after, when the narrator recapitulates 
her training to become a circus act and indulges the readers’ “bearish” 
expectations: “One day, the man tied strange objects to my feet…. It hurt, 
so I pushed the floor away from me again. After several more attempts, I 
was able to balance on two legs” (Tawada, Memoirs 4). Even if readers are 
unfamiliar with the traditional (albeit now forbidden) practice of training 
bears to stand up by setting the floor of their cages on fire, the description 
suffices to imagine a bear being forced to get up on her hind legs. Yet the 
next paragraph, graphically detached from the last sentence, finally makes 
the illusion of “becoming polar bear” collapse: 
Writing: a spooky activity. Staring at the sentence I’ve just written makes me 
dizzy. Where am I at this moment? I’m in my story—gone. To come back, I drag 
my eyes away from the manuscript…. I stand at the window of my hotel room, 
looking down at the square below that reminds me of a theater stage. (4)
In a rapid, unmediated shift from the protagonist’s mind to the narrator’s, 
the text foregrounds the conditions of its production, the means of creating 
and crafting animal first-person experiences. As a result, the passage man-
ages to break the illusionary spell of being inside a polar bear’s mind. The 
pattern of the chapter is now plain to see: As soon as the text beckons to 
the readers’ cognitive illusion, it is also on the point of spoiling it, only to 
enforce it, and then dispel it again shortly after.
Additionally, the representation of the grandmother bear alternates be-
tween what seems like naïve anthropomorphism on the one hand, e.g., when 
the bear’s behavior as a grown-up is described in particular “human-like” 
terms—the bear attends conferences, speaks and writes in Russian with a 
“Mont Blanc fountain pen” (19)—in particularly “human-like” terms, and 
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what appears, on the other hand, to be a “realistic” representation of the 
remembered self of the bear growing up to become the star of the circus 
ring, actually performing like a human, riding tricycles and wearing “a girly, 
lace-trimmed skirt” (22). Sequences of the narrator’s butting in, suggesting a 
human-centric frame, alternate with modes of the experiencer’s chipping in 
where ethologically sound descriptions of bear behavior unfold.8 As such, 
these crisscrossing acts of speaking-for blur the distinctions between human 
and animal representations, thereby questioning anthropocentric ontologies 
and the axioms of anthropological differences. Eventually, readers are left 
to wonder whether the bear autobiographer has actually turned out what 
her circus training had forced her to become in the first place: an animal 
performing human tasks and techniques.
Despite their individual differences, all three “bear narrators” are self-con-
scious, subjective beings negotiating their place within the confines humans 
have erected for them and interacting across species and beyond linguistic 
lines.9 In this respect, the novel can be regarded as a hybrid-generic mode 
of writing: magical realism. Tanja Schwalm argues that
in its subversive critique of Western anthropocentrism, hierarchical orderings, 
material power structures and hegemonic discourse, and in its recognition of 
nonhuman subjectivity through indigenous belief systems and the carnivalesque, 
magical realism is essentially a posthumanist mode of writing. (7) 
Tawada’s (auto)zoopoetics underscore the inherent hybridity of the bears 
growing up entirely removed from their natural habitat and made to adapt 
8 This back-and-forth movement from chipping in to butting in is not limited to the first chap-
ter. In the second chapter, Tosca describes the performed kiss exchanged between herself 
and Barbara in neutral terms, albeit subjectively focalized (159), then again claims to 
have “bought a computer” to “keep in touch by e-mail” (164) with her trainer. Similarly, 
Knut’s self-description in the third person might assume a form of chipping in, e.g., when 
the bear’s first bath is described: “Knut was placed in this bathtub. He put his right paw 
on the edge of the tub and then his left paw, because he wanted to jump out” (172); then 
again, the mode seems to be dominated by butting in, e.g., in the representation of Knut’s 
thoughts as narrow-minded and artificially infantile: “Knut grew more and more each day, 
while poor Matthias continued to shrink. Knut suddenly had the thought that perhaps the 
milk came from Matthias’ body, that he was being painfully squeezed dry day after day” 
(176). For a similar oscillation between butting in and chipping in within Knut’s first-person 
narration, cf., e.g., 220-23.
9 This becomes apparent not only in the grandmother remembering her young self-engaging 
with her trainer Ivan (e.g., 10) but also in Knut’s interactions with Matthias, (e.g., 186, 
203-05) as well as in Tosca’s biography where a north pole dream sphere allows for Tosca 
and Barbara to converse with each other (e.g., 98, 104-05).
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to human institutional practices but simultaneously insist on the bears’ mate-
rial, corporeal presence as bears.
Furthermore, the text stages its poetics as poiesis, as a particular form of 
technē or artifice. This becomes apparent especially in Barbara’s self-imposed 
task of writing Tosca’s biography: “I … picked up the dwarf pencil, and 
began writing Tosca’s biography in the first person” (Tawada, Memoirs 111). 
A new paragraph then exhibits this biographical writing “in the first per-
son”: “When I was born, it was dark all around me, and I heard nothing. I 
pressed myself against the warm body beside me, sucked sweet liquid from 
a teat, and fell back asleep. I’ll give this warm body the name Mama-lia” 
(111). In this instance, the text mirrors cultural imaginations and projec-
tions constructed with regard to “animal experience.” Moreover, it stages 
the conception of animal (auto)biography as a process that meshes fact and 
fiction, human and animal life. In these acts of speaking-for, Barbara’s auto-
biography and Tosca’s biography converge. Barbara sets out writing from 
Tosca’s perspective but smoothly slides into writing about herself: 
Mama-lia’s voice was terrifying, and I found myself feeling afraid for her, even 
though I knew perfectly well I was not in danger. Humans can roar too, to intimi-
date others. At first, they use words that mean something; after a while, however, 
all you hear is a bellowing that has grown out of speech, and a person being roared 
at has no other choice but to roar back. This made me suddenly remember how 
my father left us and went to Berlin. (124) 
What has started with Tosca, ends with Barbara. The text illustrates that 
writing an “other” always means inscribing one’s self. The dividing line 
between self and other, autobiography and heterobiography, human and 
animal, is not distinct but represents a rather blurry, dubious demarcation 
based on language and self-acknowledgement. 
Tawada’s answer to the dilemma of representing animal minds in literature 
can therefore be described as a self-reflexive performance of constructing and 
deconstructing animal experience in language. The text first indulges the 
readers’ cognitive illusion, then denies and dissolves it by foregrounding the 
necessary linguistic techniques of rendering animal experiences “first-hand.” 
What can be observed in this staging of the means of writing animal (auto)
biography, and what I suggest calling “(auto)zoopoetics of negativity,” is a 
constant shift, accompanied by auto-reflexive, ironic twists and turns between 
(1) fine-grained “realistic” animal phenomenology and blatant anthropomor-
phism, between (2) autobiographical and biographical narration, and between 
(3) animal and human narrative voice. On the one hand, these shifts stress the 
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discursive means of constructing animal life and experience in literary texts, 
and, on the other hand, persistently impede the readers’ impression of wit-
nessing a bear’s thinking and feeling. Furthermore, a reliance on high-fidelity 
representations of animal experience is made more or less impossible by the 
unreliability of the narrators—be they animal or human: In the first chapter, 
the narrator pictures herself as half human, half animal; in the second part, 
Tosca’s biographer Barbara is suffering from depressions and escapes from 
reality by meeting and speaking with Tosca in a fantastic “world of ice” (123). 
And in the third part, readers must concede to the fact that Knut seems to 
have developed a mental aberration after his human foster-mother left him: 
The bear thinks he has become friends with a character called Michael who 
turns out to be (the dead) Michael Jackson (cf., e.g., 240-46). 
In this respect, Tawada’s (auto)zoopoetics can be read as a challenge to 
anthropocentrism and as an ethical commitment to animal representation, 
rendering her (auto)zoopoetics a/n “(auto)zoopoetics of negativity.” As Kate 
Rigby points out in her reflections on “ecopoetics of negativity,” such a 
poetics “would need to be able to demonstrate how the work of art always, 
inevitably, fails to convey the experience of which it is a trace” (Rigby, Topo-
graphies 119). Insofar as such texts reveal the disparity of word and world, 
signifier and signified, they draw the readers’ attention from the world of 
the text to the world which the texts refer to: a world in which polar bear 
habitats are currently threatened by global warming (“Threats,” WWF), and 
in which polar bears in captivity are alleged to be depressed and prone to 
die of heat strokes (“Depressed,” BBC). Poetics of negativity withhold what 
is promised, “if that promise is an embodied experience of the more-than-
human world” (Rigby, “Come forth” 117), appealing to an experience of 
the more-than-human world beyond and behind those texts and pointing 
at the idea that we might be at the brink of losing this world that exists (and 
speaks) beyond language and literature. 
Memoirs presents its readers with the constrains of human knowledge 
while also indicating the evolutionary affinities and cultural intricacies of 
human and animal life, underscoring the epistemological and linguistic limits 
of human poiesis to fully and accurately comprehend and represent what oth-
ers—be they human or animal—think and feel. Tawada’s (auto)zoopoetics of 
negativity are at pains to make readers aware that human representations of 
animal experience inevitably fall short of what they aspire to convey. Yet at 
the same time, these animal (auto)biographical “etudes” and unsuccessful 
acts of speaking-for guide our attention to that which lies beyond human 
language, and to what it means to disregard the value of these worlds.
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(Auto)Zoopoetics and Ecopoetics
The image of an emaciated polar bear balancing on top of a tiny ice floe is 
just one of many that have become symbols of global warming to an extent 
that the actual animals seem on the point of dissolving under their heavy 
figurative burden (Tollmann). Tawada’s text, I argue, is perfectly aware of 
this dynamic. The grandmother chapter, for instance, indulges in clichéd 
references to, and representations of, polar bears—exposing the superficial-
ity of the image popular culture has conceived of this species, and thereby 
holding up a mirror to the reader’s stereotyped knowledge about polar bear 
life. Not once does the narrator explicitly identify herself as a polar bear; 
yet it is the very contriteness and triviality of the polar bear allusions which 
point at the fact that our understanding of what might amount to “being 
polar bear” is dominated by trite images and one-dimensional figurations 
carried across the media and global warming discourse. Thus, grandmother 
polar bear stuffs herself with Canadian wild salmon (44); during a confer-
ence, she elaborates on the bicycle as “the most excellent invention in the 
history of civilization, … the hero of every environmental policy” (6); and 
her first German translator is a man called “Eisberg” (32). The literary polar 
bear, therefore, mimics the narrow-minded symbolic figuration observable 
in popular culture’s representations of polar bear life. The text draws the 
reader’s attention to the various types of responsibility, not only for what 
amounts to our direct involvement in climate change but also for the circum-
scriptions of our cultural imaginations of polar bear life and the symbolic 
instrumentalization of the species.
Such an instrumentalization—and this is one of the numerous instances 
where the link between an environmental and an animal-advocacy orienta-
tion of the text is situated—becomes even more apparent when looking at 
the third chapter of the novel. As aforementioned, this chapter has polar 
bear narrator Knut recapitulate his short but turbulent life. Fact and fiction 
become firmly intertwined since the reader is confronted with a fictional first-
person account of a fairly well-known bear whose life and death amounted 
to a global media event (Kulish). Knut’s mother, in “real life,” was in fact no 
one else but Tosca, whose story is fictionalized in the second chapter.10 In 
2006, Tosca refused to provide for her cubs, supposedly as a consequence 
of the experiences she made during her former life at the GDR state circus. 
10 The character Barbara is the fictional equivalent of Ursula Böttcher, the first female animal 
trainer to perform with polar bears (Engelhard 21, 118). 
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In contrast to similar historical cases in which such newborns were killed, 
the Berlin Zoo decided not to euthanize the surviving bear but instead had 
keeper Thomas Dörflein nurse him with a bottle. When the little bear was 
first presented to the public, pictures and videos went viral on the web. 
The zoo had to put up extra toilets to accommodate more than two million 
visitors within its gates, and Sigmar Gabriel, then minister of the environ-
ment, even made himself Knut’s godfather. Yet polar bears do not remain 
small and cuddly forever. After Dörflein had to stop performing with Knut 
because of the eminent danger posed by a fully-grown polar bear, public 
interest waned. Used to being with humans, Knut was bullied after being 
introduced to an enclosure with other polar bears and died—largely forgot-
ten—in 2011 (Engelhard 19-22).
Tawada’s depiction of Knut’s life remains true to the external “facts” 
delivered by the media and the zoo’s press agency except for the names of 
the human characters. Yet in this chapter, the novel is more interested in 
the question of how Knut actually became a performance star and how this 
literal media circus and the life in confinement might have shaped Knut’s 
(self-)experiences. The text suggests a critical view of the events surrounding 
Knut’s “career.” Memoirs represents the instrumentalization of Knut, starting 
right at the inception of the bear as a public attraction. In a conversation 
with Knut’s keeper just before the first time Knut is shown to his fans, the 
vet Christian makes this blatantly obvious: 
When the television shows how happy and sweet Knut looks running around 
outside, the viewers will start to think seriously about climate change. The ice 
floes at the north pole can’t keep melting like this, otherwise in the next fifty years 
the world’s polar bear population will decrease by two-thirds. (191)
The zoo director is even more explicit, addressing the polar bear as “the 
ambassador who’s going to put a stop to climate change” (198). In fact, this 
is not a metaphor. In May 2008, Sigmar Gabriel made Knut mascot of the 
UN Convention on Biological Diversity, observing that it is difficult to im-
agine any other animal “symbolizing the consequences of climate change as 
clearly as the polar bear. No ice, no polar bear”11 (“Sogar der Minister,” dpa). 
But Tawada’s Knut is not only turned into a symbol of climate change 
implications; he is also regarded as the warrantor of the zoo as its director 
explicitly tells him: “I’m proud of you. The future of our institution rests on 
11 “[K]aum ein Tier symbolisiert die Folgen des Klimawandels so deutlich wie der Eisbär. 
Ohne Eis kein Eisbär.” 
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your shoulders” (Tawada, Memoirs 198). The text gives voice to Knut, point-
ing out—being the nonhuman “non-person” he is—that he does not actually 
have a say in any of this. Finding out that the Berlin Zoo was caught up in 
a legal dispute over which institution was entitled to the money Knut had 
swept into the tills, the animal narrator remarks: 
They were feuding over me, but I wasn’t even called to testify…. I lost my ap-
petite when I sawa caricature in which my body was drawn in the shape of a 
euro sign…. [I]t would never have occurred to me to consider myself a source of 
financial gain. (232)
Throughout the book, Tawada questions the logic of anthropocentricism 
by reflecting on subjectivity, the meaning and rights of a legal person, and 
the hubris of human rights. Knut’s grandmother had been thinking about 
this issue more explicitly: 
I began to realize that my fate and the fate of human rights were inextricably 
entwined. Still, I didn’t know the first thing about them. The concept of human 
rights had been invented by people who were thinking only of human beings. 
Dandelions don’t have human rights, and neither do reindeer, raindrops, or hares. 
At most a whale. (54)
Thus, in addition to a critical reflection on the cultural imagination and (in-
evitably) inadequate representation of nonhuman beings and their minds, the 
critical engagement with ontological anthropocentrism and environmental 
issues—as one result of this anthropocentrism—remains at the heart of the 
novel’s concerns. In this respect, the text’s (auto)zoopoetics and ecopoetics 
cannot actually be separated. They rather converge in a textual web, prob-
ing what is at stake in our commitment to and means of representing and 
instrumentalizing the more-than-human world. 
Tracing the genealogy of polar bear life in captivity, the novel not only 
challenges the treatment of animals in “entertainment” and public institutions 
but also troubles our stereotypical conception of polar bears likely to fade 
away behind the screen of environmental symbolism and climate change 
alike. The text intertwines issues of environmental justice, human and animal 
rights, while persistently pointing us to the fact that language is doomed to 
fall short of our intention to make nonhuman others “speak their mind.” 
Foregrounding language not as that which distinguishes humans from their 
actual animal kinship, but as that which might initiate our engagement with 
other selves beyond language, the novel invites readers to consider why it 
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might be worthwhile to commit themselves to action which might transcend 
the act of speaking-for.
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